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In his famous discussion of the source 
of our duties concerning anirrals, the German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant approvingly men-
tions a series of engravings ( "The Four 
Stages of Cruelty") by the English artist 
William Hogarth as exemplifying one of his 
central contentions. [2] The approach to our 
duties regarding anirrals advocated by Kant 
holds that avoiding cruelty is the most fUn-
damental duty we can have to nonhuman ani-
mals. For convenience, I shall refer to this 
view as the "No-Cruelty" j:X)sition. It is not 
surprising that Kant cites Hogarth while 
explaining his own views; Hogarth's engrav-
ings provide a rich visual statement about 
the nature of cruelty and the moral status of 
its victims. 
That there is a duty to avoid cruelty is 
not very controversial; condemning cruelty 
is somewhat analogous to condemning child 
abuse. The existence of such a duty is suf-
ficiently obvious that arguing for its exist-
ence would be unnecessary in most contexts. 
This is so even with respect to the duty as 
applied strictly in the case of nonhuman 
animals. Moreover, thinking about our duties 
with respect to an:im3.ls in tenns of avoiding 
cruelty is a common way of approaching the 
subject. Legislation "protecting" animals, 
for example, is often presented under the 
rubric of "prohibiting cruelty," and many of 
Ule traditional organizations that have 
worked for improved treatment of animals have 
shared this view, describing their task ei-
Uler as "the prevention of cruelty" of as 
"the promotion of humaneness."[3] These are 
but two examples of the ways in which the 
notion of cruelty is deeply embedded in our 
way of thinking about the evils done to ani-
mals. As a result, the appeal to avoiding 
cruelty as the central claim on behalf of 
animals has the advantage that it appeals to 
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i terns of co=n moral currency and is thus 
less controversial than some claims on behalf 
of anirrals might be. 
Nevertheless, with the rise of various 
critiques of traditional assUIUptions regard-
ing the rroral status of animals, the appeal 
to avoiding cruelty as a foundation for our 
duties concerning animals has been abandoned 
by many today. Understanding why this has 
occurred is partly a matter of UI1derstanding 
why traditional assumptions about the moral 
status of animals are so UI1satisfactory. 
Despite differences among those critical of 
these assumptions, I take it that a common 
feature of many is rejection of speciesism. 
The No-Cruelty view appears to many to be a 
relic of an era in which those who would 
assist animals shared the speciesistic out-
look of those against whom animals needed 
protection. Implicitly, the No-Cruelty view 
is seen as failing to give proper place to 
the value of the animals themselves. 
I believe that these criticisms are 
appropriate. The arguments for re-thinking 
our fundamental ideas about human-animal 
relations are well known and need not be 
repeated here. [4] Nevertheless, in my exper-
ience, it is still common for people, even 
those who would identify themselves with the 
anirral rights movement, to focus primarily 
uj:X)n cruelty in thinking about treabnent of 
animals they consider UI1ethical. This raises 
the question of what role this concept should 
play in a more enlightened ethic. Central to 
this task is understanding both why the con-
cept of cruelty is so appealing as a tool on 
behalf of anirrals and why it ultimately 
PHILOSOPHY 
proves inadequate if relied upon too heavily. 
That is the limited task I shall approach 
here, and for this purpose, Hogarth'sengrav-
ings provide an excellent pictorial starting 
place. 
Hogarth •s engravings [5] trace the devel-
oping cruelty of one Tom Nero, focusing on 
the growth of his cruelty from childhood to 
ironic reward in his own death and mutila-
tion. Each of the four scenes depicts a 
moment displaying the inflicting or conse-
quences of cruelty. But none of them would 
have the meaning it presently has outside the 
context of the series; we are asked to take 
the claim that each is a stage quite serious-
ly. Though each scene appears to capture an 
isolatable moment, they are clearly part of 
an unfolding process. In fact, Hogarth con-
veys this important idea in the very title of 
Figure 1 
the series, "The Four Stages of Cruelty." 
The cruelty Hogarth is interested in depict-
ing cannot be understood in terms of moment-
ary or isolatable acts but is, rather, some-
thing larger, consisting of stages. 
In "The First Stage of Cruelty" (fig. 
1), Tom Nero is the central figure in a scene 
which is nothing less than an orgy of cruel-
ty, perpetrated almost entirely by children 
upon various animals. Amid such brutalities 
as a cockfight, suspending two cats together 
by the tail, and burning a bird' s eye, Tan 
can be seen thrusting an arrow into the anus 
of a dog. A second boy holds the powerful 
dog's legs, while a third controls the crea-
ture with a rope around his neck. A fourth 
dog seeks to intervene by offering Tom a 
bribe to withdraw. Yet a fifth boy is seen 
to the side Witnessing the event. He draws a 
primitive picture of someone hanging from the 
gallows, under which appears the name "Tom 
Nero." 
It is worth noting that despite all the 
evident brutalization of these animals, this 
dog is the only creature in the scene whose 
agony is unmistakably manifested. While one 
m~ight maintain that the rest of the char-
acters in this scene are depicted lrore ab-
stractly in order to draw our attention to 
the central action, this does not hold up 
under scrutiny. The other characters are 
depicted with varying degrees of detail, but 
even when they are drawn as concretely as 
Nero and this dog, the victims do not show 
the effects of their suffering very clearly, 
if at all. Hogarth •s interest here and 
throughout these engravings is clearly more 
focused on the victimizer than on the victim. 
We see quite clearly the expressions of the 
children in this first stage; they are gener-
ally wearing pleasant smiles. In the case of 
the boy blinding the bird, the expression 
seems particularly fiendish. The children 
seem to enjoy their "play." The omission of 
the agony of these victims is remarkable when 
one first notices it. Hogarth almost seems 
to regard the suffering of these victims as a 
distraction from his real subject matter. 
The next scene, "The Second Stage of 
Cruelty" (fig. 2), again reveals an abundance 
of cruelty. In the upper portion of this 
scene, we find an overburdened donkey being 
spurred forward with a pitchfork. In the 
center, a.beer cart driven by a fellow appar-
ently in a drunken stupor runs over a child. 
In the foreground, a shepherd clubs one of 
his flock into oblivion.[6] 
The first and second stages share the 
theme of brutalizing animals, but the second 
stage no longer involves the brutal ~ of 
children. The single exception to this in-
volves a bull-baiting to be seen in the back-
ground of this scene. The cruelty manifested 
in the second stage represents more "adult" 
forms of behavior, brutalities associated 
mostly with work. Interestingly, the anomal-
ous bull-baiting is depicted as somewhat 
distant from the central action of this 
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scene, suggesting a bridge between the first 
and second stages. The "playful" cruelty 
associated with childhood forms the back-
ground of the kinds' of cruelty to be found in 
the lives of adults. Indeed, this is the 
central message of "The Four stages of Cruel-
ty," and so the inclusion of the bull-bailing 
is not really surprising. It fits into the 
second stage quite well, when we consider 
both its placement in the second and the 
over-all context of the series. 
As before, Tom Nero is the central fi-
gure of the second stage. Hog-arth seems to 
suggest in this scene that Tom's flaws are 
growing to include not only the brutality of 
ti1e first stage but also neglect and ingrati-
tude, as he now beats the horse that provides 
his very living as a hackney coach drive . 
The carriage is overloaded with men wh; :rre 
both well-dressed and well-fed, apparently 
penurious barristers. [7] This stage places 
Nero's senseless brutality in the context of 
similar abuses of beasts of burden or live-
stock, thus representing it not so much as an 
aberration but as business as usual. In case 
the variety of accepted forms of cruelty were 
not great enough in this scene, Hog-arth in-
cludes advertisements on the wall to the left 
for a boxing match (between one James Field 
and George Taylor) as well as for cockfight-
ing. Again, Hogarth includes the lone figure 
recording Tom's ugly deeds. 
The third stage, "Cruelty in Perfection" 
(fig. 3), depicts the final growti1 of Tom's 
cruel character. Having impregnated his 
mistress, Ann Gill, he then hacked her to 
death to avoid following through on his com-
mitment to run off with her. The letter in 
the foreground tells the story of her betray-
ing her employer--at Torn's urging--in prepar-
ation to run off with Nero. Scattered fram 
the sack she was carrying is the silver she 
stole for them. Nero's cruelty has now led 
both to the corruption and brutal murder 
(note the tremendous gashes in her throat and 
wrist) of another human. His cruelty has now 
grown to such proportions that it is now 
inflicted upon the humans closest to him. 
His own expression appears to be one of re-
vulsion at his own action. The lone witness 
of Torn's deeds of the first two stages has 
now been replaced by a rrob. But unlike the 
witness of the first two stages, the rrob does 
not passively observe the deeds; it now en-
ters the action to arrest Nero. 
In The Paradox of Cruelty, [8] Phillip 
Figure 2 
Hallie points out that Hogarth's perspective 
in "The Four Stages of Cruelty" is primarily 
focused on the victimizer rather than on the 
victims of cruelty. Hallie, recognizing that 
this focus is common in discussions of cruel-
ty, tries to counter-balance it by emphasiz-
ing the experience of the victim in his con-
sideration of the nature of cruelty. For 
this reason alone, Hallie's work is unusual 
and bears study. But it is no accident that 
we focus on the victimizer in our ordinary 
thinking about cruelty, and Hogarth's engrav-
ings exemplify the reason for this quite 
well. In the first three stages, Hogarth has 
depicted something other than individual 
acts. Cruelty is a character trait, and it 
is the developnent of this trait in Tom that 
we witness in these first three stages. The 
sense in which "The Four Stages of Cruelty" 
represents stages at all has only to do with 
the victimizer, the victims are constantly 
changing. In fact, it is through the device 
of changing the victims that Hog-arth shows 
the developnent from one stage to the next. 
Tom's cruelty grows as his victims change: 
first animals, then humans. Finally, Torn 
becomes his own victim. 
The fourth stage, "The Reward of Cruel-
ty" (fig. 4), depicts this ruination. Torn, 
having been executed for Ann's murder, is 
being used for an anatany lesson. [9] Even 
after his own death, Torn still pays for his 
crimes through, appropriately enough, the 
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violation of his own bcrlily dignity. 
Despite the seriousness of the critne and 
subsequent punishment, the occasion could be 
taken for a light-hearted affair. In fact, 
Hog-arth seems to be conmenting as much here 
on the medical profession as he is depicting 
Tom's "reward. " The anatomy lesson is pre-
sided over by a rather disinterested figure 
who sits beneath the emblem of the Royal 
College of Physicians (which depicts the 
taking of a pulse). At the upper left of the 
scene, a man with a woeful expression directs 
our attention to the skeleton of James Field 
(the boxer whose match was advertised in the 
second stage) , suggesting that Nero is to 
follow him on public display. The room is 
crowed with physicians engaged in chatter, 
joking, reading, or otherwise distracted from 
the main event. The focal point of the scene 
is Tan's head; nany lines draw attention to 
it. It ha~ been attached to a pulley by a 
rather large screw placed in his skull, while 
the hangman's noose remains around his neck. 
In an obvious throwback to the first stage, 
his eyeball is being extracted. Despite 
being dead, Nero's expression is that of 
someone enduring tremendous suffering. In 
the foreground, a dog- eats Tom's heart, com-
pleting the "reward" with an ironic twist. 
Hog-arth thus presents us with a dramatic 
depiction of the danger of cruelty: as it 
develops and grows to its "perfection," 
i.e .. , its complete form, cruelty becomes 
dangerous not only to its original victims--
animals--but also lmdermines human community. 
This contention, that cruelty to animals is 
linked to failure to live decently in human 
society, is the point that Kant approvingly 
mentions in citing Hog-arth's engravings. 
Kant's view provides the log-ical extension of 
what "The Four Stages of Cruelty" depicts. 
If the real problem with cruelty to animals 
is that it may lead us to brutalize humans, 
then our abhorrence of cruelty to animals 
need not be explained by attributing any 
rroral status to the animals themselves. The 
likelihood that violations.of humans ensue 
from cruelty to animals is sufficient on 
Kant's view to explain the wrongness of cru-
elty to animals. In considering this view, a 
rather fundamental concern should be whether 
the implicit empirical claim that cruelty in 
the one case leads to cruelty in the other is 
correct. There may well be sane cormection 
between the two, but the ability of humans to 
distinguish animals from humans in the myriad 
ways we do (in both thought and deed) should 
give us pause in thinking that those who are 
cruel to animals cannot draw the line. If 
this claim turns out to be false after all, 
none of our alleged duties to animals would, 
on the Kantian view, turn out to be duties at 
all. Then we would be forced to the absurd 
position that there simply is nothing that 
one could do to an animal that is objectiona-
ble. 
The No-Cruelty view is not identical 
with the Kantian view. It need not be com-
mitted to the pro.fX)sition that duties to 
animals depend solely on their cormection to 
dllties owed to htTInans. But in identifying 
cruelty as the major ill in our dealings with 
animals, it shares other faults with such a 
.fX)sition. One such problem is clearly shown 
in Hog-arth' s engravings. Each act in the 
first three scenes is a stage in the develop-
ment of a character trait, until we find it 
in its "perfection." Tan Nero's youthful 
acts are, for Hog-arth, clearly cruel in light 
of the later stages. As mentioned before, 
Hog-arth 's emphasis -on victimizer rather than 
on victim is no accident; the concept of 
cruelty places a person's character at the 
heart of the matter. It is not the victim's 
character that is in. question, and this is 
why it is so easy to speak of or depict 
cruelty as if it has no victim. 
For some pur.fX)ses, focusing on the char-
acter of the perpetrator is just what is 
called for. But the language of cruelty is 
in other contexts counter-productive. Focus-
ing on cruelty, because it directs us to an 
individual •s character, can displace the 
discussion in two related ways. First, it 
has a tendency to produce defenses of the 
good character of of the individuals in ques-
tion. This defensiveness can be a hindrance 
to genuine dialogue about what we owe to 
animals in our treabnent of them. Thus, the 
usefulness of charging cruelty depends on who 
one wants to have the dialogue with; it seems 
generally llOre useful when speaking to a 
third party than in direct dialogue with the 
accused. Second, since focusing on cruelty 
draws attention to the character of individu-
als, this language suggest that the problem 
is one of personal aberration, an individual 
who has stepped outside the limits of accept-
able behavior. To suggest this is to fall 
into the hands of those who wish to defend 
such behavior as complying with currently 
acceptable standards, i.e., the status ~. 
A particularly pointed example of both 
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Figure 3 
of these p::>ints occurred recently when the 
Animal Liberation Front (ALF) raided some 
University of california at Riverside (UCR) 
laboratories. The newspapers covering this 
event rep::>rted that a sp::>kespersonfor the 
ALF charged that the experiments being con-
ducted in these labs were cruel. The inmedi-
ate resp::>nse from the University was to cane 
to the defense of the researchers, main-
taining that there had been no abuses of 
animals by these individuals. Here, of 
course, "abuse" means "nothing out of the 
ordinary, as far as research procedures go." 
As evidence of this, the University produced 
recent inspection rep::>rts from a laboratory 
"accrediting" agency (MlUAC). [10] Here both 
elements are represented: the charge of 
cruelty eliciting a personal defense of the 
researchers and that defense consisting of 
placing the researchers' behavior within 
accepted institutional standards. 
Clearly, the major p::>int of the ALF's 
act was lost in this exchange. Their chal-
lenge is of a more fundamental nature than 
the language of cruelty permits. It is a 
challenge to the very standards that institu-
tions such as AAALAC and UCR appeal to in 
justifying their programs of exploiting ani-
mals in the name of human benefit. Further, 
the speciesistic assumptions underlying such 
justifications are what must be called into 
question. Given the CC!11IlOn understanding of 
the personal nature of cruelty, this concept 
seems particularly unfit for this purp::>se. 
The undesirability of this distraction 
from victim to victimizer is not the only 
reason the language of cruelty proves inade-
quate for the work of objecting to the mass 
exploitation of animals our society engages 
in. The concept of cruelty serves best when 
the act or practice in question is uncontro-
versially objectionable. Few who view "The 
First Stage of Cruelty" would pause to ask 
whether these acts are really cruel. But 
when we turn to standardly accepted uses of 
animals in agriculture and science, for ex-
ample, it is less obvious that the language 
of cruelty is most useful. People are not as 
ready to see scientists and farmers as cruel. 
The No-Cruelty view suffers a theoretic-
al difficulty that may help us understand why 
the language of cruelty is unsuited to moving 
people to see that the status quo is objec-
tionable. Of course, part of the reason for 
the hesitation in seeing current practices as 
cruel is simply ignorance; many are not aware 
of what is really happening behind the closed 
doors of the labs and the fences of the 
farms. But where there is not such ignor-
ance, the concept of cruelty simply does not 
serve well as the most fundamental ethical 
category. It fails to provide us with a 
measure or criterion of what should be avoid-
ed. 
What is cruelty? Cruelty is either the 
taking of pleasure in or indifference to 
someone's suffering, depending on whether we 
are speaking of sadistic or non-sadistic 
cruelty. [11 ] In either case, cruelty is a 
failure to give sufficient account to suffer-
ing imposed. Now, an animal's suffering will 
have been given sufficient account when we 
have weighed it appropriately with respect to 
its place among the other values involved in 
the situation. But how much is this? What 
place does an animal's suffering or harm have 
in a scheme of values? Implicit in any judg-
ment of cruelty is the judgment that sane-
one's suffering is too much, but a general 
prohibition of cruelty cannot by itself tell 
us how much is too much. The decision, then, 
that something is cruel does not provide a 
useful criterion for decisions about contro-
versial cases; rather, it presupp::>ses an 
independent means of lnaking this kind of 
judgment. 
The deflection of attention from victim 
to victimizer in our COlTUlDn concept of cruel-
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t.y[12] is thus tied up with a range of prob-
lems. It can make us focus on the perpetrat-
ot:' without providing enough insight into the 
true locus of value, the victim, and it is 
precisely this deeper insight into the value 
of the victim of such institutions as factory 
fanrring and scientific researd. that our 
society needs. As Hogarth so brilliantly 
depicts, the language of cruelty has an im-
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Figure 4 
portant place in the assessment of human 
virtues and vices. But, as Hogarth also 
unwittingly reveals, our COll1IIDn notion of 
cruelty cannot bear the weight that we some-
times try to put on it. If we are to reflect 
the realization that animals constitute a 
locus of value independent of the meaning of 
our actions for ourselves, it is clear that 
we must employ other concepts, such as re-
specting the interests and rights of animals. 
Only when we see this more clearly will we 
understand the important but limited role 
that the concept of cruelty can play in advo-
cating serious change in our society I s rela-
tions with animals. 
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"WE ARE ALL NOAH" explores the ethical 
teachings of Judaism and Christianity as 
they apply to various forms of human 
interaction with nonhuman animals. 
Arrong 'the fonns =nsidered are 
in science: the use of nonhuman 
animals in cosmetic and other toxi-
city testing 
in agriculture : intensive-rearing 
or close-oonfinement systPJQS in fac-
tory fanns 
in hunting: the traditions of sfOrt 
and recreational hunting 
in trapping: the methods used to 
secure pelts for fur coats and re-
lated products 
in ccxnpanion-animal relations: the 
numbers of unwanted =mpanion ani-
rnals killed in pounds and shelters, 
and sold to research facilities. 
Representative thinkers from the Jewish 
and Christian religious =mmunities re-
sfOnd to each form of interaction. The 
central questions discussed are 
What should an informed, sensitive 
Jew or Christian think about how 
these animals are treated? 
What should a responsible, compas-
sionate Jew or Christian do in the 
face of this treatment? 
''WE ARE ALL NOAH" does not offer simple 
answers to complex questions. Rather, 
it offers members of the Judeo-christian 
religious =mmunities an oPfOrtunity to 
understand what these questions are and 
why men and wanen of sincere oonvictions 
cannot avoid asking them, whatever their 
answer. 
Like Noah of old, =ntemfOrary Jews and 
Christians must take resfOnsibility for 
(Continued on page 49) 
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